(পূর্ববর্তী পর্বের পর)
১৯৬৯ থেকে যখন বাংলাদেশের স্বাধিকার আন্দোলন যখন স্বাধীনতার আন্দোলনে রূপ নিতে শুরু করল, সেই সময় থেকে ঘটে যাওয়া অনেক ঘটনার কলকাঠি নেড়েছে মার্কিন যুক্তরাষ্ট্র, প্রায় সকল ঘটনাই সংগঠিত হয়েছে আমেরিকার জ্ঞাতসারে। সেই সময়ের অনেক অনেক মুল্যবান গোয়েন্দা তথ্য, টেলিগ্রাম, রিপোর্ট ক্লাসিফায়েড হিসাবে মার্কিন ষ্টেট ডিার্টমেন্ট এর কাছে সংরক্ষিত ছিল্।

২০০৫ সালে মার্কিন যুক্তরাষ্ট্র ১৯৬৯ থেকে ঘটে যাওয়া স্বাধীনতার পূর্বাপর ঘটনাগুরিকে সাধারণ জনসাধারণের জন্য উন্মুক্ত বা ডি-ক্লাসিফায়েড করে দেয়। এই ডকুমেন্টসগুলি মার্কিন Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972 নামে সংরক্ষিত ও সর্বসাধারনের জন্য উন্মুক্ত আছে। এই E-7 ভলিউমের ভিতর আছে অনেক অজানা তথ্য, অনেক বর্বরতার ইতিহাস, সেই সময়ের রাজনৈতিক পটপরিক্রমার খবর।

এখানে আমি মুল ইংরেজী টেক্সট এর চুম্বক অংশ লিংকের সাথে সাথে তুলে দিচ্ছি। নতুন প্রজন্ম ও যারা স্বাধীনতার অনেক অজানা সত্যকে জানতে চান তাদের এই লিংকগুলি ভিজিট করে পুরো দলিলগুলি পড়ার অনুরোধ করছি।

মার্কিন গোয়েন্দা সংস্থা সিআইএ কর্তৃক বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধের সম্ভাব্য ফলাফল পর্যবেক্ষন

চুম্বক অংশ
This estimate assesses the present and prospective state of the Pakistani civil war, the role of India and other powers, and the outlook for Pakistan's two components -- if the Bengali uprising should be put down, and if it should succeed.
THE ESTIMATE

I. THE CONFLICT IN BENGAL

1. When they launched their campaign on 25 March, the West Pakistani military leaders probably expected -- or at least hoped -- to destroy the Awami League (AL) and regain effective control of East Bengal in a matter of days, if not hours. They clearly miscalculated; most of the top AL leaders have been arrested, but lower level party leaders continue to be active throughout much of the countryside. While no precise figures are available, substantial elements of the 13,000-man East Pakistani Rifles (the provincial paramilitary force) remain in being, as do a few of the Bengali units of the Pakistani Army. Although beset by serious logistic and leadership problems, these armed cadres continue to resist the West Pakistani units in East Bengal; they are able to move fairly easily through most of the countryside.

2. Islamabad's forces are in command of the two principal cities, Dacca and Chittagong, and a few of the lesser ones. Even there, the Army's hold is maintained by severely repressive measures and rigid curfews. Most economic activity has halted; the ports are virtually closed and most transport is disrupted. A number of bridges have been destroyed, ferry boats sunk, and rail lines (including that between Dacca and Chittagong) cut. Nonetheless, regular army forces can move through the region at will, except where inhibited by transport difficulties.

3. The prospects are poor that the 30,000-odd West Pakistani troops can substantially improve their position, much less reassert control over 75 million rebellious Bengalis. This is likely to be the case even if the expeditionary forces is augmented. For most of East Pakistan's residents, the time has come for a separate Bengali nation. Many years of economic discrimination and political repression by the west wing had made an autonomous Bangla Desh the choice of over 75 percent of Bengali voters in the December 1970 elections. The refusal of Pakistan's military leaders to honor that choice and their attempt to terrorize the Bengalis into submission have alomst certianly ended any general desire in East Bengal to see the Pakistani union continue.

4. Whether the army is to face widespread non-cooperation or continued active resistance will depend in part on how much help India gives the Bengalis. All but a few miles of East Bengal's land frontiers are with India, and the movement of arms and guerrillas across these very extensive borders cannot be prevented. There is considerable evidence that some arms shipments have already taken place.* The Indian Government's support for the Bengali's will be determined by a mix of response to domestic popular pressures -- which are quite strong -- and of an assessment of India's own national interests. Statements of support in parliament and the press have been very strong. West Pakistan, with its military forcess, has long been a principal enemy of India. A successful Bengali insurgency would serve to weaken and discredit West Pakistan. The East Wing, basically uninterested in the Kashmir dispute and never the scene of major Indo-Pakistani fighting, poses no military threat to New Delhi. To the contrary, its leaders -- particularly Mujibur Rahman of the AL -- have advocated cordial relations with India. Hence, we estimate that India will continue and increase its arms aid to the Bengalis and this will enable them to develope at a minimum the kind of insurgency capability which the army cannot entirely supress. In so doing, India is accepting the risk that some of its arms may fall into extremist hands. In the time the Bengalis may prove more than a match for the army except where the latter is consentrated in a few strong points.

7. India of course runs the risk in supporting or intervening in a Bengali rebellion. To do so could provoke Islamabad into launching an attack on Western India. However, in the 1965 war the Indian military showed itself more then a match for the Pakistanis. The Indians are now much better equipped than in 1965, and face forces weakened by transfer of Pakistani units to East Bengal.

11. So far, with the qualified exception of China, none of the major powers have shown any support for the central government’s efforts in Bengal. Moscow ahs put itself firmly on the record in opposition to the West Pakistani military suppression of East Pakistani; its choice was no doubt heavily influenced by the Indian attitude. It has called for a political settlement, and probably does not believe Soviet interests would be served by prolongation of the conflict. The Soviets have probably concluded that the odds favor a separatist solution or at least that Islamabad has little chance of imposing its will on East Bengal in any lasting and effective way.

13. Stories of atrocities in Dacca and elsewhere have been widely circulated in the Western world, and West Pakistani actions have been condemned by a number of private citizens and groups. No single Western country has much influence on the situation, but general Western disapproval may make the government in Islamabad less certain of the wisdom of present policies and more amenable to pressures for change.

PROSPECTS FOR EAST BENGAL

A. As a Part of a United Pakistan

14. In the unlikely event that the West Pakistanis did succeed in reasserting military control over the Bengalis, they would almost certainly find it impossible to develop a new political system based on anything approaching a consensus of opinion in the two wings. In the December 1970 elections, the Bengalis gave an overwhelming mandate for political and economic autonomy: opinions have since hardened. The best the West Pakistanis could hope to achieve would be something like a restoration of conditions which existed under Ayub (and which were ended by mass public uprisings in 1968-1969). Routine and low-level administrative duties would be in the hands of Bengalis loyal to Islamabad (and such individuals do remain, though they are in a minority); ultimate authority would continue to be in the hands of West Pakistani authorities, and the army would remain the final arbiter of power. The two areas would remain one economic unit, and the central government would make some effort to cope with the formidable economic problems of East Bengal. But a substantial majority of the population would continue to be strongly disaffected, probably tot he point of launching sporadic uprisings. The Pakistani Government's talk about enlisting loyalist Bengalis in any significant numbers is wishful thinking.

B. As an Independent Nation

15. The political complexion and outlook of an independent Bangla Desh are extremely difficult to forecast. If it came into being rather soon, and if Mujib and the principal AL leaders were still alive and permitted to return, they would quickly take over. Mujib's political and economic philosophies are essentially moderate ones; he wishes to develop good relations with India and adopt a generally balanced and neutralist international posture. In domestic affairs he advocates a mild type of socialism, emphasizing an improvement in the living standards of the Bengali people and a concerted attack on the many economic problems of the area. On the other hand, the longer the fighting goes on, the more the prospects for a takeover by an extremist and radical leadership could be enhanced. We know almost nothing about such radicals; in recent years the politics of East Bengali protest have focused almost exclusively on the issue of autonomy. Nonetheless, given the large number of Bengali extremists in India and the ease of interchange of ideas and people between the two regions, radical movements could develop extremely rapidly.

16. Whatever its government, and independent Bangla Desh would, in the short term, have some things going for it. Relatively speaking for an underdeveloped country, its balance of payments problems would not be bad, thanks to its large current exports of jute. It would almost certainly repudiate the large debts to West Pakistan and the outside world incurred in its name. Able to trade freely with India, as it has not been in the past, it could buy many goods more cheaply.

17. But Bangla Desh would face serious problems both in the short and long term. The floods and cyclone of 1970 raised import requirements to about 3 million tons of food grains for the period until June 1971. Some, though almost certainly not all, of this has already been met by shipments of PL 480 and West Pakistani food grains. But Bengali ports have been closed since 25 March, and ships carrying food have been diverted. The internal transportation network has been disrupted. We have no information about food conditions throughout East Bengal now, but severe food shortages are almost certain and famines in certain areas not out of the question. Beyond this, the basic economic problems in that region are as severe as those faced by any country in the world, and they appear unlikely to improve much in the next several years.

(চলবে)